United States District Court Northern district of California

San Francisco

United States of America,	Case No. CR 13-005 RS
Plaintiff, v.	STIPULATED ORDER EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
Tony Patton	JAN 2 3 2013
Defendant.	RICHARD W. WIEKING CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
For the reasons stated by the parties on the record on	, 2013, the Court excludes time under the
Speedy Trial Act from \(\sqrt{23} \), 2013 to \(\frac{219}{219} \), 2013 and finds that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. \(\frac{5}{3161(h)(7)(A)} \). The Court makes this finding and bases this continuance on the following factor(s):	
Failure to grant a continuance would be See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i).	be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.
The case is so unusual or so complex, due to [check applicable reasons] the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or the trial itself within the time limits established by this section. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).	
Failure to grant a continuance would d taking into account the exercise of due	leny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, e diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, given counsel's other scheduled case commitments, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).	
Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).	
IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: 1/23/13	LAUREL BEELER United States Magistrate Judge
STIPULATED: Attorney for Defendant	Assistant United States Attorney